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Abstract
This work deals with the problem of investors' irrational behavior and ¯nancial products' misperception. The the-
oretical analysis of the mechanisms driving wrong evaluations of investment performances is explored. The study
is supported by the application of Monte Carlo simulations to the remarkable case of structured ¯nancial products.
Some motivations explaining the popularity among retail investors of these complex ¯nancial instruments are also
provided. Investors are assumed to compare the performances of di®erent projects through stochastic dominance rules
and, to pursue our scopes, a new de¯nition of this decision criteria is introduced.
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The need to make forecasting on future performances of economic and ¯nancial variables is out of
discussion and the way to do this represents the focus of a endless scienti¯c debate. In this respect,
decision theory can be seen as the ¯eld that describes and formalizes the process of making a choice
among several possible uncertain alternatives. In a rational ¯nancial market, given an identical set
of opportunities, two di®erent individuals should operate the same choices, once the decision rule is
¯xed. Surprisingly, the decision rule is often violated and choices toward the objectively-measured
less attractive situations are often registered. This evidence plays a central role in ¯nancial theories
grounded on the psychology and the human judgment of investors. In this respect, two di®erent
questions arise: why random amounts are misperceived? How does the misperception mechanism
work? To give possible answers to such questions represents the focus of behavioral ¯nance. In
particular, the latter question is tackled by prospect theory.
In this paper we provide theoretical results, supported by numerical analysis, on how investors
distort the stochastic returns and, unreasonably, prefer complicated ¯nancial derivatives to standard
ones. We apply our arguments to the analysis of structured ¯nancial products which seems to be
appropriate for our purposes. A possible motivation for the misrepresentation of such instruments is
provided through a behavioral-¯nance type argument. In particular, we show that the presentation
by investment banks (or insurance companies) to investors of optimistic prospectuses may represent
the ground of the wrong perception mechanism.
The decision tool we deal with is the stochastic dominance, since it undoubtedly represents one
of the most general way to compare ¯nancial products. The stochastic dominance criteria rely
on the distribution functions of the random amounts and take into account the whole set of their
characteristics (i.e.: fat tails, kurtosis, asymmetry, etc.).
This paper contributes to the existing literature in some directions. First, we deal with the problem of
misperception of structured ¯nancial products, which is quite neglected in ¯nancial studies. Despite
the scarce attention paid to this topic, it represents a really important issue, since structured products
are very popular mainly among retail investors and households. Second, a behavioral ¯nance-type
discussion on our results, based on the main features of structured ¯nancial products, is addressed.
In particular, the misperception concerning structured products can be interpreted as a consequence
of the reticent prospectuses proposed by ¯nancial institutions to investors. In a more general context,
we argue that investments banks and insurance companies are morally responsible of some irrational
investors' behaviors and related dramatic consequences. Third, we analyze some peculiar types of
distortion of random amounts. In particular, in accordance with some classical models of time series
analysis, we assume that random sums may be perturbed via a deterministic trend or a lump sum.
The former case concerns a global rereading of random amounts, while the latter relies on a investors'
local misunderstanding of some realizations. Fourth, we refer to stochastic dominance decision
rules and, in this respect, we propose a weak de¯nition of stochastic dominance by considering the
investors' misperception of random amounts. This new de¯nition can be compared with the ones
already existing in literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: next section presents a review of the literature on
behavioral ¯nance and prospect theory, with a focus on stochastic dominance as decision criteria.
Section 3 is devoted to the statement of the theoretical results regarding the violation of stochastic
dominance and provides a new de¯nition of stochastic dominance. Section 4 is related with the
main features of structured ¯nancial products and presents the numerical analysis methodology and
results. In section 5 a discussion on our ¯ndings is carried on, together with some concluding regards.
2 Literature review
This section is mainly a survey on behavioral ¯nance, prospect theory and stochastic dominance,
with a guided tour among their connections. The contributions of some remarkable academic papers
are rationalized, even if these topics are still the focus of a great number of researches. The interest
in behavioral ¯nance is witnessed by the surveys of Shleifer (2000), Hirshleifer (2001) and Barberis
and Thaler (2003), some devoted special issues of academic journals, and a dedicated journal. Prob-
1lems related with prospect theory have been studied by uncountable followers of the Nobel prize
Daniel Kahneman and his colleague Amos Tversky. A review on prospect theory can be found in
Edwards (1996).
Stochastic dominance is commonly accepted as one of the most relevant decision rule. To the best
of our knowledge, the most recent monograph on stochastic dominance is provided by Sriboonchitta
et al. (2010), who present also several applications to economics and ¯nance, but we mention also
Levy (2006).
The analysis of some irrational behaviors of the investors is the focus of an endless and intriguing
scienti¯c debate. It is commonly accepted that ¯nancial markets are populated by di®erent types
of investors. Among them, irrational traders play a key role, since they take positions out of ra-
tionality which are able to in°uence market's dynamics. In this respect, two questions arise: how
does the mechanism driving the unreasonable choices works? Why the misperception mechanism is
implemented by investors? As already stressed, these questions are tackled by behavioral ¯nance
and, in particular, the former question represents the target of prospect theory.
The presence of not fully rational traders is responsible for the occurrence of discrepancies between
prices and fundamental values. The persistence of such deviations is analyzed from a theoretical
point of view in Friedman (1953). The Author argues that the deviation implies a good investment
opportunity and rational traders balance the discrepancy created by irrational traders by exploiting
this attractive situation. The empirical evidence shows results that are partially in disagreement
with Friedman's point. Indeed, even though it is accepted that deviation is synonymous of attractive
opportunity, the strategy implemented by investors to exploit such a situation is sometimes risky
and costly, and mispricing does not disappear. Substantially, the irrationality is often nested in the
rationality and it is more popular than what one expects.
Ritter (2003) highlights the causes of investors' irrationality through some speci¯c e®ects. The
heuristic e®ect, explored in Benartzi and Thaler (2001), is grounded on the attitude of the investors
to allocate money in a simple way. In particular, empirical evidence shows that the capital is often
equally distributed among available funds, even if the funds experienced very di®erent past perfor-
mances. The overcon¯dence e®ect, related to psychology, describes the optimistic investors' vision
about their ability to make exact forecasts. Barber and Odean (2001) discuss this point and conclude
that this e®ect is registered mainly when investors are men or entrepreneurs. The mental accounting
e®ect takes into account the paradoxes caused by the separation made by investors of those deci-
sions that should be taken jointly or, conversely, by the improper aggregation of di®erent aspects
related to a single decision. In this respect, the evaluation of the same good is di®erent when the
motivations for owning it are di®erent (separation), or the evaluation of an investment improperly
takes into account the amounts already corresponded (aggregation). The formalization of this theory
begins with Thaler (1980) and it is further developed in Thaler (1985, 1990, 1999). The framing
e®ect explains how decisions depend on the way the available alternatives are proposed. In Tversky
and Kahneman (1981) and Bazerman (1983) the same experiment, in a slightly di®erent fashion, is
presented. People are grouped in two similar populations, P1 and P2, and a choice between a gamble
A or a secure plan B is proposed to each individual. A change in the frame of A and B implies a
reversal of preferences, in terms of percentages of choices in P1 and P2. The representativeness e®ect
is ¯rst hypothesized by Reichenbach (1934) who describes the attitude to overweight the importance
of the most recent experiences. In a larger sense, people in°uenced by this e®ect, guess that the
salient global properties of a ¯nancial or economic variable can be explored by performing a local
analysis of the related phenomenon. In contrast with the latter e®ect, the conservation e®ect can
be introduced in order to formalize the slow adjustment to the changes in the ¯nancial environment.
The disposition e®ect is the tendency of the investors to sell gaining assets and keep losing assets.
Its formalization is due to Shefrin and Statman (1985). In Weber and Camerer (1998) this e®ect
is experimentally evidenced with the observation of time-varying positions taken in a market by
individuals that buy and sell shares of six risky assets.
The above described e®ects provide a set of motivations for the investors' irrationality and the
introduction of these aspects in quantitative models based on decision criteria is necessary. The
introduction of subjective utility functions and risk aversion allows to explain some investors' be-
haviors. In this respect, several seminal researches concerning decision-making under uncertainty use
2increasing and concave utility functions (see, for example, Arrow, 1971; Lintner, 1965; Markowitz,
1952a; Pratt, 1964; Ramsey, 1928; Samuelson, 1958; Sharpe, 1964). However, the classical risk-
averse utility theory is rather unsatisfactory for explaining some irrational investors' choices, since
the axioms underlying the risk-averse utility framework are systematically violated in a wide variety
of contexts. The most famous paradoxes dealing with this problem are discussed in Allais (1953)
and Ellsberg (1961). As a further supporting argument, the disposition e®ect let understand the
occurrence of a di®erent perception between gains and losses in investors' mind. Friedman and
Savage (1948) and Markowitz (1952b) theorize the existence of such a switch in investors' mind
between risk-aversion and risk-seeking, in correspondence of some critical amounts. This remark is
formalized through the assumption according to which the utility function can show one or more
risk-seeking segments. In particular, Markowitz (1952b) speculates on utility functions that are ¯rst
concave, then convex, then concave, and ¯nally convex, to address Friedman and Savage's concerns
(1948) on the reasons why investors buy insurance (risk-aversion) and lotteries tickets (risk-seeking).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) conduct psychological experimental researches to provide an empir-
ical validation of Friedman, Savage and Markowitz speculations. The experimental results of their
analysis give that the preferences of the 87 ¡ 88% of subjects depend on the changes of the wealth,
x 2 R, through an increasing S-shaped value function, V (x), which is concave for x > 0 and con-
vex for x < 0. Moreover, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) show that investors distort subjectively
probabilities and overweight the rare events. They provide the constitutive framework of prospect
theory, for which Daniel Kahneman is one of the Nobel laureates in 20021. Despite the relevance of
prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky start from some restrictive assumptions. The most relevant
weakness of their setting concerns the introduction of a riskless outcome among the prospects to
be evaluated. Certainty may a®ect investors' decisions with the so-called certainty e®ect. Further
details on this point can be found in Battalio et al. (1990) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981).
In particular, Schneider and Lopes (1986) argue that the value function cannot be S-shaped when
there is not a riskless outcome.
A further important consequence of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) relies on the formalization of
the mechanism driving the irrational choices of investors. Once again, we stress that irrationality is
grounded on the psychological attitudes of each subject, which is able to distort the evaluation of the
involved random amounts. In this context, the topic of performance measures is of some importance.
Among the available tools used to compare the admissible ¯nancial projects, the stochastic domi-
nance criteria, developed in Fishburn (1964); Hadar and Russel (1969); Hanoch and Levy (1969);
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), are undoubtly the most popular, since they allow to explore the whole
set of characteristics of the random amounts2. Despite this, as we will see, stochastic dominance
can be violated in a direct or indirect way. In the former case, investors prefer project A instead of
project B, even if A is dominated by B. In the latter case, project B is underpriced with respect
to a dominated project A or, alternatively, the transitivity property fails, i.e. C dominates D and
D dominates E, but E is preferred to C. Tversky and Kahneman (1986); Birnbaum and Navarette
(1998); Leland (1998) deal with the problem of direct violations and provide also an explanation
of the reason why violations take place. In particular, they propose a behavioral-¯nance argument
grounded on the scarce transparency of how the stochastic dominance rules should be used to order
a set of ¯nancial projects. The indirect violations are more frequent than the direct ones, as argued
in Birnbaum (1997) and references therein.
Needless to say that stochastic dominance violations can be viewed as base of misperception pro-
cesses and related irrational choices of investors. In this sense, prospect theory can appropriately
describe the biasing mechanisms because of the ¯rst order stochastic dominance violation as in the
original Kahneman and Tversky's setting. To solve the problem related with ¯rst order stochastic
dominance violation the cumulative prospect theory is introduced (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
In the new setting, the Authors extend the previous theory to the case of random amounts with
a continuous set of realizations. In the new framework, the probability distortion is interpreted
as acting on the cumulative probability distribution rather than on the probabilities. Cumulative
prospect theory improves prospect theory for what concerns the wider range of analysis. Never-
1Amos Tversky passed away in 1996, but his valuable contribution is acknowledged in Kahneman's Nobel lecture.
2For a survey on stochastic dominance we refer to Levy (2006).
3theless, in a behavioral ¯nance perspective, the violation of stochastic dominance is not necessarily
a weakness for describing decision mechanisms, because people often choose dominated lotteries.
On the other hand, empirical evidence shows that investors usually violate higher order stochastic
dominance rather than the ¯rst order one, because of their sensitivity to risk.
The subjective preferences of investors and human intervention in comparing amounts are respon-
sible of the violation of the stochastic dominance. The cumulative prospect theory does not admit
¯rst order stochastic dominance violation, but higher orders may continue to be violated. In order
to take into account this important point, some new concepts of subjective stochastic dominance
rules are necessary.
According to the original framework of prospect theory, related to changes of wealth, risk-aversion
for gains and risk-seeking for losses, Levy and Wiener (1998) and Levy and Levy (2002, 2004) develop
the prospect stochastic dominance criteria to determine the dominance of one project over another,
for all S-shaped utility functions. Furthermore, Levy and Levy (2002) introduce also the Markowitz
stochastic dominance to determine investors' preferences of one investment alternative over another,
for all reverse S-shaped functions, in agreement with the original formulation of Markowitz (1952b).
Leshno and Levy (2002) deal with the existence of the so-called pathological preferences, which are
utility functions violating the expected utility criterion. In this context, they de¯ne the almost
stochastic dominance rules to determine preferences of a project over another for all utility func-
tions that are not pathological preferences.
Prospect theory and stochastic dominance rules are widely used to analyze and compare di®erent
investments alternatives. When a violation is detected, its roots are explained through behavioral
¯nance arguments. It is out of the scope of this review to provide an extensive description of the
continuously growing literature on these ¯elds. As already preannounced in the Introduction, our
contribution focuses on the misperception of structured products motivated by the framing e®ect.
Therefore, we conclude this section just giving two remarkable references addressing similar ques-
tions. Berger and Smith (1998) focus on the prospect theory based on framing e®ect. In particular,
the Author propose an experiment on three simultaneous framing tactics and develop a discussion on
their individual main e®ects and their interactions. The problem is presented in a rather qualitative
fashion and perhaps it can be well inserted in the ¯eld of marketing. Bernard et al. (2009) discuss
on the overpricing of some structural products due to too optimistic framing of the prospectuses
proposed by investment banks to retail investors.
3 Theoretical framework
In this section the statement of theoretical results regarding the violation of stochastic dominance
in a cumulative prospect theory framework is presented. In doing so, a new de¯nition of stochastic
dominance rules will be provided.
Consider a random variable X on a probability space (­;F;P) with a cumulative function FX. Fix
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In order to be self-contained, it is worth to recall the de¯nition of stochastic dominance.
De¯nition 1. Consider n 2 N and two random amounts X and Y .






X (r) · A
(n)
Y (r); 8r 2 R
and
9r¤ 2 R suchthat A
(n)




Fix n 2 N and consider two random amounts X and Y , such that X >n Y . If an investor has
a particular subjective perception of pro¯t and losses related to Y , then the n-th order stochastic
4dominance may be violated and the investor may prefer Y instead of X. Substantially, the random
amount Y is perceived as a random amount Yp, that can be viewed as a perturbation of Y and such
that Yp >n X. The distortion of Y is attained by introducing a rule R which transforms Y in Yp.
More formally, R is a two variable function which transforms the support and density function of Y
into the support and density function of a di®erent random variable, named Yp.
To our purposes, the de¯nition of a subjective concept of stochastic dominance criteria, based on
the perturbing rule R, is introduced.
De¯nition 2. Consider n 2 N, two random amounts X and Y and a perturbing rule R.
Y R-dominates stochastically of order n X (Y >nR X, hereafter) if and only if Yp >n X, where Yp
is the perturbation of the random amount Y generated by the rule R. Conversely, X >nR Y if and
only if X >n Yp:
It is worth noting that De¯nition 2 is based on the misperception of just one of the two projects to
be compared. This asymmetry represents the main di®erence between the proposed new concept and
the de¯nitions given by prospect and Markowitz stochastic dominance that are based on particular
transformations of both the investments to be compared. The proposed approach is motivated by
the necessity to take into account decision rules which are based on the misperception of only one
of the investments under scrutiny. As we will see, this is suitable with the structured products case.
This paper, in accord with the classical literature on time series analysis, treats two remarkable
cases: Yp is obtained by perturbing Y with a lump sum or a deterministic trend. The related rules
will be denoted hereafter as R1 and R2, respectively.
3.1 Lump sum
De¯ne a random mass Z as follows:
Z =
½
¹ z; with probability ¼;
0; with probability 1 ¡ ¼. (3)
where ¹ z 2 R+ and ¼ 2 (0;1):
The random sum Yp is de¯ned through the rule R1 as follows: Yp = Y + Z.
The following result holds true.
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(4)
Proof. The result is straightforward, by invoking the induction principle and by de¯nition of Yp.
Proposition 4. Fix n 2 N and assume that X >n Y . For each ¹ z 2 R+ and ¼ 2 (0;1), we have
X >nR1 Y .
Proof. The cases n = 1 and n ¸ 2 are separately treated.
² Assume n = 1.
Since X >1 Y , we have
A
(1)
X (r) · A
(1)
Y (r); 8r 2 R and 9r¤ 2 RjA
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that is satis¯ed only when p = 0, since the second term of (7) is not positive. We can conclude that
X >1R1 Y .
² Assume n ¸ 2.





























¹ z > sup
r>¹ z
n



















then the second condition of (8) can not be attained, and this completes the proof.
3.2 Deterministic trend
The rule R2 is introduced by the de¯nition of an increasing function t : R ! R, that can be viewed
as a deterministic trend a®ecting the realizations of the random sum Y . The intervention of the
function t on Y drives the de¯nition of the perturbed random amount Yp through the cumulative
probability function:
FYp(r) = FY (r ¡ t(r)): (9)
The following result is trivial, but it is useful to formalize it in order to pursue a precise analysis of
the ¯rst order stochastic dominance in this context.
Proposition 5. Assume that X >1 Y . If the function t is such that A
(1)
Y (r ¡ t(r)) · A
(1)
X (r), for
each r 2 R, and there exists r¤ 2 R such that A
(1)
Y (r¤ ¡ t(r¤)) < A
(1)
X (r¤), then Y >1R2 X.
For the stochastic dominance of order greater than 1 no general results can be explicitly for-
malized. We then restrict the analysis only to the most frequent cases, well-known in the ¯nancial
econometric literature: constant trend and linear trend.
² Constant trend
In this case t(r) = t 2 R, for each r 2 R.
Proposition 6. For each n 2 N, we have
A
(n)
Yp (r) = A
(n)
Y (r ¡ t) (10)
Proof. We use the induction principle.
By de¯nition, the thesis is true when n = 1.
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6By using Proposition 6 we derive a su±cient condition for the inversion of the stochastic domi-
nance criterion.
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Then Y >nR2 X.
Proof. By Proposition 6 and by De¯nition 2 we obtain the thesis.
² Linear trend
In this case there exists ® 6= 0 such that t(r) = ®r, for each r 2 R.







Y (r ¡ ®r): (12)
Proof. Also in this case, the result is proved by using the induction principle.
For n = 1, the result is trivially true.




























Y (r ¡ ®r);
and the result is proved.
Proposition 8 implies the following su±cient condition for the inversion of the stochastic domi-
nance relation.
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Then Y >nR2 X.
Proof. The proof comes from De¯nition 2 and Proposition 8.
The theoretical results show that misperception is attained when perturbation is given by the
introduction of a trend, while no stochastic dominance violation takes place when a lump sum
is introduced. This ¯ndings provide interesting information since a trend a®ects the entire set of
realizations of a random amount, while a lump sum is related to an impulsive shock. Therefore, when
agents have a global misperception irrationally prefer the worst project. Conversely, the presence of
an adjunctive isolate gain in the dominated project is not able to invert agents' mind and drive the
decision process.
74 Structured ¯nancial products
Structured products, also known as market-linked products, are generally pre-packaged investment
strategies based on derivatives written on a single security, a basket of securities, options, indices,
commodities, debt issuances and/or foreign currencies and, to a lesser extent, swaps. The variety of
products just described is demonstrative of the fact that there is no single, uniform de¯nition of a
structured product.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission3 (SEC) de¯nes structured securities as "securities
whose cash °ow characteristics depend upon one or more indices or that have embedded forwards
or options or securities where an investor's investment return and the issuer's payment obligations
are contingent on, or highly sensitive to, changes in the value of underlying assets, indices, interest
rates or cash °ows".
To the de¯nition given by the SEC it may be added that a common feature of some structured
products is represented by a principal guarantee function, which o®ers protection of principal if held
to maturity.
Structured products, usually issued by investment banks or a±liates, are synthetic securities created
to meet speci¯c needs that cannot be satis¯ed by standardized ¯nancial products and are proposed
as an alternative to direct investments, as part of the asset allocation process to reduce the risk
exposure of a portfolio, or to utilize current market trends. These investment tools are also avail-
able at the mass retail level, since one of their attractions is the ability to customize a variety of
assumptions into one instrument.
Disadvantages of structured products may include: credit risk (structured products are unsecured
debt from investment banks); lack of liquidity (structured products rarely trade after issuance and
anyone looking to sell a structured product before maturity should expect to sell it at a signi¯cant
discount4); high complexity (the complexity of the return calculations means that only few investors
truly understand how the structured product will perform relative to simply owning the underlying
asset). At the latter point we can tie a further consideration related to the lack of pricing trans-
parency. Since there is no uniform standard for pricing, it is hard to compare the net-of-pricing
attractiveness of alternative structured products and investor cannot know for sure what are the
implicit costs of the instrument.
The market-linked products considered in this paper and representing the subject of the numerical
application are globally-°oored, in the sense that provide a guaranteed minimum return. Hence, ab-
sent default risk, the ¯nal return will never be less than a prespeci¯ed °oor applying to the entire life
of the contract. Furtermore, using real world examples, capped contracts will be considered. These
type of structured products are quite popular in the world of equity derivatives, since they o®er
protection against downside risk, coupled with signi¯cant upside potential. Capping the maximum
ensures that the payo® is never too extreme and that the value of the contract is not too outrageous.
The basic reasons why this type of structured contracts is considered here are essentially due to their
popularity among retail investors and their weird characteristics, which are not fully understood and
have not been widely studied in literature. In particular, we will show that locally capped contracts
are dominated by the globally capped ones but, surprisingly, the formers are more popular than the
latters. In this respect, the percentage of globally °oored contracts listed in the AMEX, as April
2008, is about 45% for the locally capped contracts and about 10% for the globally capped ones.
To explain this irrational behavior, a prospect theory perspective, through the introduction of a
constant trend, will be used and a behavioral ¯nance type discussion for this misperception will be
provided.
4.1 Globally °oored - locally/globally capped contracts
In many cases, the redemption amount paid out on guaranteed mimimum return product depend
exclusively on the periodical performance of the underlying asset (i.e. the reference portfolio).
3SEC, Rule 434 regarding certain prospectus deliveries
4Because of this, structured products tend to be more of a buy-and-hold investment decision rather than a means
of getting in and out of a position with speed and e±ciency.
8It is not uncommon to lock in gains at speci¯c dates, capping the periodical returns at a given
maximum. At maturity, the payo® is given by a combination of periodic returns that are added5 to
the guaranteed redemption amount and paid out to the investor.
The ¯nal payo®, YT, for this globally °oored - locally capped contract is given by (Boyle and Tset,
1990, Boyle et al., 2009):
YT = Y0
(















with T representing the maturity of the contract; Y0 the amount paid at the inception date, t = 0;
F the global °oor (guaranteed minimum return at maturity); c the local cap (maximum allowed
periodical return) and Stk 2 [0;T] the price of the reference portfolio at the prespeci¯ed dates tk.
The maximum and minimum pay-o®s of this contract are given respectively by Y0 (1 + nT ¢ c) and
Y0 (1 + F).
This market-linked product is characterized by high complexity since its ¯nal pay-o® is highly path-
dependent and cannot be easily replicated. From the point of view of the seller, aimed at minimizing
market risk, their main exposure is to volatility since this contract is very subtle in its dependence
on the assumed volatility model. The classical references to this phenomenon which is not the focus
of this paper are Avellaneda et al. (1995) and Lyons (1995) and Wilmott (2000).
Conversely, a particular and simpler case is given when the redemption amount of a contract is made
up of a guaranteed minimum return (i.e. the °oor rate) and a bonus return which varies according
to the performance of the reference portfolio between the issue and maturity dates. The bonus
return in this case is calculated as a percentage of the di®erence by which the price of the reference
portfolio on the maturity date exceeds its price on the issue date. If the price falls, no bonus return
is paid out and the rate of return of the structured products is given by the °oor rate. Thus the
investor pro¯ts from a rise in the price of the reference portfolio but, if the price drops, does not
have to bear the loss, since the bearer only participates in the relative performance of the reference
portfolio up to a certain maximum value.
The issuer promises a ¯nal payo® proportionate to the change in the reference portfolio's price. In
cases where the price of the reference portfolio decreases, the issuer guarantees a minimum redemp-
tion amount. At the same time, the issuer limits the investor's participation in the instrument's
performance by setting an upper limit (i.e., the global cap).
The standard ¯nal payo®, XT, for a globally °oored - globally capped contract is given by (Boyle
and Turnbull, 1989; Bernard et al., 2009):
XT = X0
½












with T representing the maturity of the contract; X0 the amount invested at the inception date,
t = 0; F the global °oor (guaranteed minimum return at maturity); C > F the global cap (maximum
allowed return); S0 and ST the price of the reference portfolio at the inception date and maturity,
respectively.
The initial investment of X0 yields a rate of return in the closed interval [F;C]. The cap becomes
operational only if the return of the reference portfolio on the interval [0;T], computed as ST
S0 ¡ 1,
exceeds the global cap rate C.
By no arbitrage the current price of this contract can be replicated by a portfolio of three securities: a
long position in a zero coupon bond which reaches maturity on T and has a face value of X0 (1 + F); a
long position on X0
S0 European call options on the underlying reference portfolio with strike S0(1+F)
and maturity T; a short position on X0
S0 European call options on the underlying reference portfolio
with strike S0(1+C) and maturity T: It is worth noting that the maximum pay-o® of this contract
is given by X0 (1 + C); while the minimum pay-o® is X0 (1 + F). Hence, to avoid arbitrage must be:
5It is worth to notice that there are two common types of globally-°oored locally-capped contracts, the compound
contracts, where returns in each year are compounded, and the simple contracts where the returns are periodically
added together to give the ¯nal payo®.
9(1 + C) > erT > (1 + F); (16)
with r representing the risk-free rate.
4.2 Simulation results
The complex (globally °oored - locally capped) and simple (globally °oored - globally capped)
contracts described in the previous section show quite di®erent properties. In particular, the ¯rst
one is characterized by a highly path-dependent ¯nal pay-o® for which there is no closed form
solution to compute its initial price. On the contrary, the simpler contract can be decomposed into
a portofolio consisting of a zero coupon bond and two standard call options. Thus it may even be
priced using Black and Scholes' formula.
Since the application of this work is based on a comparison of the two above described structured
products, we believe the two contracts should be priced and analyzed using the same numerical
methodology, in order to achieve more reliable results.
As per usual, in case of path dependency property required to determine the ¯nal payo® (i.e. Asian
options, barrier options, cliquet options and many other exotics), one of the most commonly used
approach is Monte-Carlo (MC) method since, as opposed to other numerical approaches, o®ers
a greater °exibility and becomes increasingly attractive compared to other methods of numerical
integration as the dimension of the problem increases.
The ¯rst building block of this application based on the globally °oored - globally capped and
globally °oored - locally capped (from now on simple contract and complex contract, respectively)
is represented by the fair determination of the global and local cap, C and c respectively. To ¯nd
these quantities, using Black-Scholes-Merton's assumptions6, we take the expectation under the risk
neutral distribution of the payo®, discounted at the risk free rate of return, assuming the price and
other contract parameters as given, and solving for the global and local caps that make the price of
the two contracts equal to an assigned level b P.
We use here the standard lognormal model for the reference portfolio, St, so that the accumulation
factors St
St¡1 are independent and identically lognormally distributed. The complex contract involves
the sum of lognormal random variables that, with a su±ciently large number of simulations, can
provide arbitrarily close to the true value of the contract (Boyle et al., 1997).
Using the assumption of no arbitrage, the expectation is taken with respect to a transformation of
the original probability measure (i.e. the risk-neutral measure; see Du±e, 2001, for a survey on the
subject).
The applied approach consists of the following steps.
² Select a given vector of parameters, » =
h
T X0 = Y0 F r ¾ ± S0 b P
i
, where S0 is
the current stock price, r is the riskless interest rate, ± and ¾ are respectively the dividend yield
and the volatility of the reference portfolio, T is the contract's maturity, F is the minimum
guaranteed return, X0 is the amount invested, b P is the price of the contract at time zero.
² Select an integer q and a q-dimensional vectors, ¡, whose elements are the values to be assigned
to the unknown global cap, C.
² Simulate sample paths of the underlying state variables (e.g., underlying reference portfolio
price) over the relevant time horizon, T, according to the risk-neutral measure. As in Black-
Scholes-Merton's model, we assume the reference portfolio price follows a log-normal di®usion.
Independent replications of the terminal stock price under the risk-neutral measure can be
generated from the formula:
6Despite the stringent assumptions of the Black-Scholes-Merton framework, Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005) and
Wilkens and Stoimenov (2007) used the celebrated approach to evaluate structured products issued in Germany.
More realistic assumptions (i.e. stochastic volatility and interest rate; jumps in the stochastic process describing the
underlying dynamics, credit risk, etc.) could be considered, but this is not the focus of this work.
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TZi i = 1;:::::m (17)
where the Zi are independent samples from the standard normal distribution and m = 104.




























; j = 1;:::;q: (18)
² Average the discounted cash °ows over sample paths and ¯nd j¤ 2 f1;:::;qg such that ¡(j
¤)
minimize the distance of the risk neutral price b P
(j)
simple from the given price b P: Lastly, denote




Similarly, we ¯nd the local cap level, c, of the complex contract, implementing an appropriate
discretization for (17). Using the given vector of parameters, »; and the q-dimensional vectors,° = ¡
°(j)¢
j=1;:::;q, whose elements are the values to be assigned to the unknown local cap, c, we ¯nd
j¤ 2 f1;:::;qg such that °(j¤) minimize the distance of the risk neutral price b Pcomplex from the given
price b P:





























To perform the numerical analysis we choose the vector of parameters,
» =
h
T X0 = Y0 F r ¾ ± S0 b P
i
, for both simple and complex contracts. The contracts
share the same underlying, S, whose dynamics is described by (17), with parameters r = 0:05,
± = 0:02, ¾ = 0:15 and S0 = 10: Simple and complex contracts have the same maturity (T = 5
years), same initial investment (X0 = Y0 = 1;000) and same guaranteed minimum return (F = 0:1).
In both cases the initial price of the contract is b Psimple = b Pcomplex = 920. The complex contract
is based on a quarterly sum cap (n = 4) and the estimated fair cap that produces an initial value
b Pcomplex = 920 is b c = 0:0867 each quarter. The fair global cap level, producing an initial value
b Psimple = 920, is b C = 0:3053. The parameters selected for the application correspond to standard
market assumptions. However, the results hold also for di®erent vectors of parameters, ».
Given the vector of parameters, »; the second building block of this application relies on the simu-
lation of the ¯nal payo®s for the simple contract, XT, and complex contract, YT: In addition, here
we implement stochastic dominance rules in order to classify, according to their ¯nal performances,
the two contracts representing the subject of the analysis.
Using (17) and (15), with ¡(j
¤) = b C and m = 104 replications, we obtain the empirical probability
distribution for the globally capped contract, XT: Using an opportune discretization for (17) and
(14); with °(j¤) = b c and m = 104, we get also the empirical probability distribution for YT:
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.
Caption of Figure 1: Simulated PDF of the globally and locally capped contract.
Figure 1 shows the empirical probability distribution functions of the payo®s of the simple contract
(globally capped, left side), XT, and the complex contract (locally capped, right side), YT. Given
the assumptions about the vector of parameters, », the complex contract has a very high probability
of yielding the minimum guaranteed return, F = 10%, with a probability mass of 62:32%. The
probability of attaining a return greater than 70% is 0:79%, while the probability of the maximum
attainable return in the right tail, b cnT = 173;4%; is pratically equal to 0.
11It is worth to notice that the sum of 20 quarterly returns will be equal to 173;4% if and only if all
consecutive quarterly returns exceed the local cap level, b c = 0:0867, so that the probability of this
event is virtually quite impossible.
On the other hand, the simple contract has a distribution characterized by two probability masses:
one at the minimum guaranteed return F = 10%, with probability 51:65%, and the other at the
maximum attainable return, b C = 30:53%; with probability 30:56%. Thus, investors have a proba-
bility of only 17:79% of obtaining an intermediate return between these two extremes. As it can be
seen, the returns are almost uniformly distributed in the central part of the distribution (as shown
in the graph on the left side of Figure 1).
In order to evaluate the random amounts of the two considered contracts via the stochastic dom-
inance criteria discussed in previous section, two distinct prospects for the simple and complex
contracts, with cumulative density functions respectively given by b FX and b FY , are determined.
Given (1) and de¯nition 2, we have that X dominates stochastically Y of order n 2 N (X >n Y ) if





X (r) · b A
(n)
Y (r); 8r 2 R
and
9r¤ 2 R suchthat b A
(n)




Applying (20) to the simulated cumulative density function of the simple and complex contracts we
obtain results that partially contradict what occurs on the real markets and highlight the problem
of investors' irrational choices. In particular, even though market data suggest that the complex
contract, Y; is more popular among retail investors than the simpler contract, X;we ¯nd that the
stochastic dominance criteria predict that consumers should prefer the simpler contract, X.
In order to verify (20), we test wheter X dominates Y of order n, running the algorithm described
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j (r) = b A
(n)
X(j)(r) ¡ b A
(n)
Y (j)(r) (22)
and 1(¢) denotes the indicator function.
The simulation results can be summarized as follows: global X is not dominated neither dominates
local Y of the ¯rst order; in 55% of cases we have X >2 Y and in 100% of cases we obtain X >3 Y:
Our simulated results clearly point out that investor having von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tions and expected utility maximizer should prefer contract X to contract Y . Therefore, the pop-
ularity of the locally capped contracts with respect to the globally capped ones is counterintuitive,
and can be explained through investors' irrational behavior. Since ¯rst order stochastic dominance
requires that investors prefer higher returns to lower ones, implying a utility function with a non
negative ¯rst derivative, on the ground of the obtained results we can conclude that this type of
investor is indi®erent in the choice among the two contracts. On the contrary, tests based on second
order stochastic dominance, positing diminishing marginal utility (su±cient for risk aversion) and
third order stochastic dominance, implying the empirical attractive feature of increasing absolute
risk aversion (non-negative third derivative), provide signi¯cant results in favor of the simple con-
tract.
The third building block of the application is based on the implementation of the misperception al-
gorithm which describe the mechanism that push retail investors to chose complex products, instead
of simple ones. As remarked in the previous section, the misperception algorithm is applied only
to one of the two considered projects since we need to take into account decision rules which are
based on the misperception of the complex structured product, Y . Given the obtained theoretical
results, we will consider the rule R2 in the particular case of constant trend, t(r) = t 2 R, 8 r 2 R
to perturbate the empirical cumulative distribution function of the contract Y and to map Y into Yp.
The misperception algorithm allows us to ¯nd the minimum constant trend, t¤, such that FY (r ¡ t¤) ·
12FX (r) for each r 2 R: The optimal t¤ will provide an inversion of the investors' preferences according
to the ¯rst and second order stochastic dominance.
The approach consists of the following steps:
² Given the j = 1;:::;K prospects obtained in the second building block, select an integer v and
a v-dimensional vectors, ¢ = (¢(l))l=1;:::;v, whose elements are the values to be assigned to
the unknown constant trend, t.








² Run the algorithm described in the ¯rst building block to obtain X(l), with l = 1;:::;v:
² Evaluate, for each element lth of the v¡dimensional vector ¢, the stochastic dominance criteria
as determined by the perturbation of the complex contract, Y , as above. In particular, in order
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(r) ¡ b A
(n)
X(l)(r): (24)
² Find the minimum value l¤ 2 f1;:::;vg such that Y
(l)
p >n X(l).
Running the procedure for n = 1;2; we ¯nd that: with t¤ = 0:453 the perturbated complex
contract dominate for the ¯rst order stochastic dominance the simple contract, Y >1R2 X; in the
71% of the K cases; with t¤ = 0:4672 we have Y >1R2 X; in the 100% of the K cases and with
t¤ = 0:0316 the perturbated complex contract dominate for the second order stochastic dominance
the simple contract, Y >2R2 X:
The results imply that if investors erroneously perceive that the probability mass (62:32%) of the
complex contract return is concentrated in correspondence of 46:72% in such a way that the most
likely ¯nal wealth is given buy YT = 1613:92; they select the complex contract in light of the ¯rst
stochastic dominance criteria.
5 Results and concluding remarks
In this paper the problem of misperception is tackled, with a particular reference on why and how it
is implemented. A theoretical analysis is presented and supported by some simulation results. This
is a key issue to explain the popularity of some complex structured ¯nancial products. In particular,
the preference accorded by investors to locally-capped contracts with respect to globally-capped ones
is motivated by the framing e®ect, which is commonly exploited by ¯nancial institutions to pursue
pro¯t targets.
Some points need to be emphasized, in order to highlight the ¯ndings of this paper.
² The simulation results derived for the structured products allows us to state an hypothesis to
formalize the misperception mechanism for locally-capped contracts. It is undoubtly true that
a violation takes place, since the complex contracts are unreasonably more popular than the
simple ones. An explanation of the reasons why global caps are misperceived can be obtained
by analyzing the main features of this type of ¯nancial product and developing a behavioral
¯nance argument.
We recall that the presence of a guaranteed minimum return and the easy access to these
products make them suitable for retail investors and households. The behavior of this type of
agents in a market is generally driven by the con¯dence on the ¯nancial institutions proposing
the investments. In this respect, the intervention of investment banks and insurance companies
13in retail investors' decisions plays a key role. Financial institutions pursue pro¯t targets and
therefore may present ¯nancial products in a rather fraudulent fashion, exploiting the fram-
ing e®ect on investors' choices. Structured ¯nancial products, with a particular focus on the
locally-capped contracts, can be seen as a case of misperception due to framing. Financial in-
stitutions usually show to potential investors some prospectuses on the future performances of
the local cap. Clearly, not all the possible scenarios can be shown, because of the randomness
of the evolution of the reference underlying. Scenarios may vary depending on two parameters:
the probabilities of their occurrence and the expected returns at the expiration date. A fair
and honest proposal should re°ect either optimistic and pessimistic outcomes, and the sample
scenarios should be opportunely weighted with their related occurrence probabilities. Almost
all developed Countries regulates this aspect, by introducing some devoted regulations. For
instance, the Federal Act on Collective Investment Schemes (the so-called CISA) entered into
force in Switzerland on January 1st, 2007 establishing some transparency and simpli¯cation
criteria introduced to guarantee a conscious understanding of the structured products to the
investors. CISA provides also a guideline to the contents of the prospectuses that ¯nancial
institutions should submit to investors' attention. A further example can be found in the Pre-
vention of Fraud (Investments) Act, issued in UK in 1959 and aimed at protecting investors
by the introduction of penalties for fraudulently inducing investors to invest their money. In a
larger sense, this rule induces banks and insurance companies to propose the structured ¯nan-
cial products without reticences on their bad admissible future performances. Unfortunately,
the reality is quite di®erent and the state securities acts are systematically violated. It is also
worth noticing that the mispricing of complex structured products is commonly accepted to
be one of the roots of the actual ¯nancial crisis since they are subject also to credit risk and
their true implicit risk is not fully disclosed to investors. The prospectuses that investment
banks propose to their clients are often too optimistic and the framing e®ect may push in-
vestors to purchase these products, even if they are reasonably unsuitable for a wide part of
households. Details on this argument are presented in Bernard et al. (2009), where some
samples of real prospectuses for locally-capped contracts are reported. Furthermore, in Illinois
the lawyers Burke and Stoltmann are preparing arbitration claims to recover losses against
Wall Street brokerage ¯rms for the selling of structured products7. They deeply investigate
this phenomenon and conclude that such investments were not clearly presented to investors
and inappropriately pitched as 100% safe and secure.
To conclude, we think that ¯nancial institutions are sometimes morally responsible for the
negative consequences due to investors' misperception, in the sense that they frame in a un-
clear way the main characteristics of such investments to pursue pro¯t targets. Bernard et
al.(2009) report some real examples extracted from the prospectus proposed by several invest-
ment banks.
² The introduction of a new de¯nition of stochastic dominance is needed to capture the se-
lectiveness of the distortions in evaluating di®erent projects. With this respect, we propose
stochastic dominance rules based on the misperception of one of the investments to be com-
pared. This choice is grounded on the evidence, discussed partially above, that investment
banks may emphasize some positive aspects and be reticent on other remarkable character-
istics of the investments. In this case, it is rather obvious that just one of such investments
will be misperceived by the client. In this direction, it would be an intriguing development
of this work the replication of the original Kahneman and Tversky's experiment. One may
subgroup people in two identical populations P1 and P2 and propose two gambles, say G1
and G2, with a great number of stochastic future performances and with G1 stochastically
dominating by G2. Letting G2 always fairly presented, one could present G1 fairly to P1 and
frame G1 with optimistic scenarios for population P2. By repeating the experiment for a large
number of optimistic prospectuses, an empirical analysis of the stochastic dominance inversion
by comparing the behaviors of P1 and P2 may be performed. One can also get information
on the risk attitudes of the population P2: Moreover, if the misperception is hypothesized to
7More information on http://www.structuredproductfraud.com/
14depend on a deterministic trend rule on G1 as in our approach, it is possible to deduce the
minimal levels of trend parameters allowing the violation of n-th order stochastic dominance.
² The misperception is theoretically attained when the complex contracts are distorted by the
introduction of a trend, while no stochastic dominance violation takes place when a lump sum
is introduced. This ¯nding provide an interesting information on the nature of the human
judgment implemented by investors, when the performance measure is the stochastic domi-
nance. A trend a®ects the entire set of realizations of a random amount, while a lump sum
is related to an impulsive shock. Therefore, investors having a certain global misperception
irrationally prefer the worst project. Conversely, the presence of an isolate gain in the domi-
nated investment is not able to invert subjects' mind and drive the decision process. A future
theoretical research in this direction concerns the introduction of di®erent misperception rules.
References
[1] Allais M. (1953). Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats
et axiomes de l'¶ Ecole Americaine. Econometrica 21, 503-46.
[2] Arrow K. J. (1971). Essays in the theory of risk bearing. Chicago: Markham Publishing Com-
pany.
[3] Avellaneda M., A. Levy and A. Para`s (1995). Pricing and hedging derivative securities in
markets with uncertain volatilities. Applied Mathematical Finance 2, 73-88
[4] Barber B., Odean T. (2001). Boys will be boys: gender, overcon¯dence, and common stock
investment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 261- 292.
[5] Barberis N., Thaler R.(2003) A survey of behavioral ¯nance. In: Constantinides, G., Harris,
M., Stulz, R. (Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
[6] Battalio R. C., Kagel H. and K. Jiranyakul (1990). Testing between alternative models of choice
under uncertainty: some initial results. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 3, 25-50.
[7] Bazerman M. H. (1983). Negotiator judgment: A critical look at the rationality assumption.
American Behavioral Scientis 27, 211-228
[8] Benartzi, S., Thaler, R. (2001). Naive diversi¯cation strategies in de¯ned contribution savings
plans. American Economic Review 91, 79- 98.
[9] Berger P.D., Smith G.E. (1998). The Impact of Prospect Theory Based Framing Tactics on
Advertising E®ectiveness. Omega, International Journal of Management Science 26(5), 593-
609.
[10] Bernard C., P. Boyle and W. Gornall, William (2009). Locally-Capped Investment Products
and the Retail Investor. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1101796
[11] Birnbaum M.H. (1997). Violations of Monotonicity in Judgment and Decision Making. In:
Anthony A. J. Marley (ed.), Choice, Decision, and Measurement: Essays in Honor of R. Duncan
Luce. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 73-100.
[12] Birnbaum MH. and J.B. Navarrete. (1998). Testing Descriptive Utility Theories: Violations
of Stochastic Dominance and Cumulative Independence, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 17,
49-78.
[13] Boyle P. and S.M. Turnbull (1989). Pricing and Hedging Capped Options, Journal of Futures
Markets 9, 41-54.
[14] Boyle, P. and Y. Tse (1990). An algorithm for computing values of options on the maximum or
minimum of several assets, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 25, 215-227.
15[15] Boyle, P., M. Broadie and P. Glasserman (1997). Monte Carlo methods for security pricing,
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 21, 1267-1321.
[16] Du±e D. (2001). Dynamic Asset Pricing Theory, 3rd English Edition, Princeton University
Press.
[17] Edwards, K. (1996). Prospect theory: A literature review. International Review of Financial
Analysis 5, 19-38.
[18] Ellsberg D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of Economics
75, 643-69.
[19] Fishburn P.C. (1964). Decision and Value Theory. Wiley, New York.
[20] Friedman M. (1953). The case for °exible exchange rates. In: Essays in Positive Economics
(University of Chicago Press) 157-203.
[21] Friedman M., and L.J. Savage. (1948). The utility analysis of choices involving risk. Journal of
Political Economy 56, 279-304.
[22] Kahneman D. and Tversky A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk.
Econometrica 47, 263-291.
[23] Hadar J., Russell W.R. (1969). Rules for ordering uncertain prospects. American Economic
Review 59, 25-34.
[24] Hanoch G., H. Levy. (1969). The e±ciency analysis of choices involving risk. Review of Economic
Studies 36, 335-346.
[25] Hirshleifer D. (2001). Investor psychology and asset pricing. Journal of Finance 56, 1533- 1597.
[26] Leland J.W. (1998). Similarity judgments in choice under uncertainty: A reinterpretation of
the predictions of regret theory, Management Science 44, 659-672.
[27] Leshno M., Levy H. (2002). Preferred by all and preferred by most decision makers: almost
stochastic dominance. Management Science 48, 1074-1085.
[28] Levy H. (2006). Stochastic Dominance: Investment Decision Making Under Uncertanity. Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Boston MA.
[29] Levy M., Levy H. (2002). Prospect Theory: Much Ado About Nothing? Management Science
48(10), 1334-1349.
[30] Levy H., Levy, M.(2004). Prospect theory and mean-variance analysis. Review of Financial
Studies 17, 1015-1041.
[31] Levy H., Wiener Z. (1998). Stochastic dominance and prospect dominance with subjective
weighting functions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 16, 147-163.
[32] Lintner, J. (1965). Security prices, risk, and the maximal gains from diversi¯cation. Journal of
Finance 20, 587-615.
[33] Lyons, T.J. (1995). Uncertain volatility and the risk-free synthesis of derivatives, Applied Math-
ematical Finance 2 117-133
[34] Markowitz H. M. (1952a). Portfolio selection. Journal of Finance 7, 77-91.
[35] Markowitz H. M. (1952b). The utility of wealth. Journal of Political Economy 60, 151-156.
[36] Pratt J. W. (1964). Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica 32, 122-136.
[37] Ramsey F. P. (1928). A mathematical theory of saving. Economic Journal 38, 543-559.
16[38] Ritter J.R. (2003). Behavioral ¯nance. Paci¯c-Basin Finance Journal 11(4), 429-437.
[39] Rothschild M. and Stiglitz J.E. (1970). Increasing risk: I. de¯nition, Journal of Economic Theory
2(3), 225-243.
[40] Samuelson P. A. (1958). An exact consumption-loan model of interest with or without the social
contrivance of money. Journal of Political Economy 66, 467-482.
[41] Schneider S. L., and Lopes L. L. (1986). Re°ection in preferences under risk: Who and when
may suggest why. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance
12, 535-548.
[42] Sharpe W. F. (1964). Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium. Journal of Finance
19, 425-442.
[43] Shefrin H.and M. Statman (1985). The disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too
long, Journal of Finance 40, 777-790.
[44] Shleifer Andrei (2000). Ine±cient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
[45] Sriboonchitta S., Wong, W.K., Dhompongsa, S., Nguyen, H.T. (2010). Stochastic Dominance
and Applications to Finance, Risk and Economics. Chapman & Hall/CRC, Boca Raton, USA.
[46] Stoimenov. P.A. and S. Wilkens (2005) Are structured products fairly priced? An analyisis of
the German market for equity-linked instruments, Journal of Banking and Finance 29, 2971-
2993.
[47] Thaler, R. H. (1980) Towards a positive theory of consumer choice, Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 1, 39-60.
[48] Thaler R. H.(1985)., Mental accounting and consumer choice, Marketing Science 4 , 199-214.
[49] Thaler R. H. (1990). Saving, fungibility and mental accounts, Journal of Economic Perspectives
4, 193-205.
[50] Thaler R. H. (1999). Mental accounting matters, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12(3),
183-206.
[51] Tversky A. and Kahneman, D. (1981). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice.
Science 211(4481), 453-458.
[52] Tversky A. and Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational choice and the framing of decision. Journal of
Business 59, 251-278.
[53] Tversky A. and Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation
of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5, 297-323.
[54] Weber M. and Camerer C.F. (1998). The disposition e®ect in securities trading: an experimental
analysis Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 33(2), 167-184
[55] Wilkens S. and P.A. Stoimenov (2007). The pricing of leverage products: an empirical inves-
tigation of the German market for long and short index certi¯cates, Journal of Banking and
Finance 31, 735-750.
[56] Wilmott, P. (2000). Paul Wilmott on Quantitative Finance. John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
17